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The occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) are amajor recipient of global aid flows,
ostensibly aimed at improving development outcomes for the Palestinian
population. This article presents a critical analysis of the ways that development
is being conceived and practiced by major actors in the oPt. By analyzing
different conceptions of power, the article examines how dominant approaches
to development hide the ongoing reality of Israeli settler colonialism by
dehistoricizing Zionism and its project; incorporating the structures of Israeli
occupation into official Palestinian development strategy; and promoting an
economic perspective that views development as an objective and disinterested
process operating above (and outside) power relations. After considering some
of the ramifications of current approaches to development, the article concludes
with brief remarks on how this critique can help to reframe and articulate an
alternative strategy.
Palestinian Aid Dependency and Israeli Settler Colonialism
THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES are one of the most aid-dependent regions of the world; per
capita foreign aid reached $579 in 2014, a level exceeded at a global level by only a handful of small
island states.1 Alongside the Palestinian Authority (PA), thousands of institutions receiving and
distributing this aid span the gamut from local and international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) to multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), as well as bilateral funders such as the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development (DFID).2 In addition to providing direct funding, these institutions also employ a
great number of Palestinians, and are thus a central component of the Palestinian economy in
their own right.3
Still, aid activities have proven largely ineffective, regardless of their high levels and of the
prominence of the question of development in the oPt, both of which have been massively
disproportionate when considered in an international comparative perspective. The Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) notes, for example, “Despite large aid flows [to the oPt],
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progress toward the Millennium Development Goals is negligible and in some cases regressing,
especially with respect to poverty, hunger, health, education, and the environment.”4 According
to the most recent Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics figures, more than one quarter of the
oPt population lived under the poverty line in 2011, with the figure for Gaza reaching close to
40 percent.5 As development indicators worsen, some of those involved in the aid industry
within Palestinian society have transformed into a new elite aligned with globalized networks of
external aid flows.6 Furthermore, the billions of expended aid dollars have led to an increase in
Israel’s effective control over the Palestinian population and not to an appreciable lessening of
Israeli suzerainty despite the establishment of the PA and the vast amount of foreign technical
and financial support allocated for its institution-building. Thus, both the intense amounts of
aid and attention to development that have been directed at the oPt have resulted in a failure
of development, a circumstance better described by Sara Roy as “de-development.”7
This article contends that the concept of development as understood by key actors in the oPt is a
major reason for that failure. International organizations—and many local Palestinian NGOs—
project a view of development divorced from the power relations at play under Israeli settler
colonialism. Advocates of this view conceive development as a neutral technocratic process whose
success hinges on the right technical and financial support from donors, a negotiated reduction in
Israeli-imposed restrictions, and the implementation of appropriate state-building policies on the
part of the PA. This mainstream perspective considers development in a vacuum, unaffected by
power relations, as a positive-sum game. In this regard, it is the lack of coordination between
stakeholders, and not the power relations completely structured around Israel’s ongoing
colonization of the area, that stands as a major obstacle to development. As a result, the dominant
development framework obfuscates, and thereby strengthens, the reality of Israeli settler
colonialism in the oPt.
In exploring the ideas outlined above, this article begins by tracing different conceptions of power
in the settler-colonial context and counterposing these to the notion of empowerment prevalent in
Palestinian development discourse. The article then examines how development approaches hide
the ongoing reality of Israeli settler-colonial power by: dehistoricizing Zionism and its project;
incorporating the structures of occupation into official Palestinian development strategy; and
foisting economic neoliberalism on the PA, wherein development is an objective and disinterested
process operating above (and outside) power relations. After considering some of the
ramifications of current approaches to development, the article concludes with brief remarks on
how this critique can help to reframe and articulate an alternative strategy.
Empowerment without Power
NGO and multilateral projects in the oPt commonly headline empowerment as a key
development goal. The World Bank openly urges “citizen empowerment” that it cites as a major
prerequisite for development across the Middle East,8 providing tens of millions of dollars in
funding to projects that operationalize the idea.9 Local and international NGOs echo this theme
both in their project titles and strategy documents. For instance, the Palestinian Businesswomen’s
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Association, a microfinance institution, speaks of “the need for economic empowerment of all
segments of society . . . with a special need to focus on women and include women actively in the
process.”10 The U.S. Department of State, through its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI),
funds a Leadership Empowerment Program that has provided $2.2 million in grants to strengthen
“targeted communities’ trust and confidence in local leaders and enhanc[e] public participation
among marginalized sectors.”11 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and CIDA fund
children’s municipal councils in the West Bank to “give children a sense of empowerment.”12
USAID funds Palestinian NGOs “to empower Palestinian youth and the adults who serve them,
so that both groups can become strong local leaders and change-makers.”13
This promotion of a seemingly activist orientation typifies a broader global shift in development
practice. Since the 1980s, governmental and multilateral donors have gradually embraced the notion
of empowerment, along with others such as decentralization, governance, and participation, as
central to development in the Global South. Consequently, as scholars Giles Mohan and Kristian
Stokke note, the language used by critics of mainstream development practices has been
appropriated and thus partially neutralized. Discursively, there is “a high level of agreement
between actors and institutions of the ‘new’ Left and those of the ‘new’ Right.”14 Nowhere is this
more evident than in how the World Bank has attempted to shift its image from the predatory,
neoliberal lender that garnered such intense criticism through the 1980s and 1990s to that of a
“pro-poor” institution “working for a world free of poverty,” as the current slogan of the bank
proudly claims on its website.15
In reality, however, this discursive shift does not mark a substantive break with earlier policies of
neoliberal structural adjustment. Instead, the shift makes those policies more palatable to the general
public while helping to facilitate their implementation by discursively reconfiguring the role of the
state within the development process. Most importantly, the championing of empowerment—and
related themes such as good governance and decentralization—places the emphasis of
development on the choices of the individual engaged in the market, as exemplified by the
proliferation of microfinance schemes. In the same vein, it emphasizes individuals from an
allegedly homogenous community or civil society while abstracting any internal power differences
within the group. We consequently see “the emergence of ‘the local’ as the site of empowerment
and hence as a locus of knowledge generation and development intervention.”16
This shift to localism sets the individual (or the community) in opposition to an inherently
predatory state, making it easier to legitimate calls to disable state interventions in the market.
Any increase of state spending for social programs, for example, can be portrayed as inefficient
and as an affront to the freedom of markets and individuals. Limiting democracy to the political
sphere and expanding the notion of freedom to include markets veil the power relations inherent
to capitalism. Such trends undermine the ability of states to determine the use, ownership, and
distribution of their economic resources because any form of democratic state-led control of the
economy would, by definition, need to restrict the activities of the private sector. As the World
Bank governance indicators confirm, restrictions can be violations of good governance.17
“Tempered by current emphasis on dismantling welfare, exerting fiscal discipline, and privatizing
state services, the neoliberally imagined empowerment logic seeks to enable grassroots actors, and
especially women, to fulfill their own needs through market mechanisms instead of relying on
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state largesse,” as Aradhana Sharma argues in an analysis of gender-focused programs in India.18 To
consider NGOs as the primary agents of development is to support the move toward a market-
driven, neoliberal developmental model.19 In a critique of mainstream development policy,
Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock sum up this view as follows: “The fine-sounding words that
are used in development policies do more than provide a sense of direction: they lend the
legitimacy that development actors need to justify their interventions.”20
A second, related feature of the focus on empowerment, community involvement, and good
governance has been an increasing reluctance to recognize and discuss the various dimensions of
structural power that shape all developmental processes in the South. The focus on the local
downplays the totality of social relations in which all communities are necessarily situated.
Development has become a problem internal to the individual (or the community), which can
best be solved through the mysterious mantra of empowerment. Underdevelopment thus becomes
the fault of the oppressed themselves, not a situation primarily conditioned by the prevailing
structures of power; the oppressed must rise to the challenge of unlocking an innate potential for
development. Of course, this is not to deny that people do possess the capacity to resist and
challenge their oppression—this is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Palestine. Despite
attempts to downplay them, power structures are necessarily inherent to all development
processes, and the primary challenge should be to overturn them and release their constraints on
social potential rather than veil them. Disregarding the structures of power actually serves to
reinforce and maintain the existing social order, just as upholding them would, and it hides the
very practice of power itself.
Empowerment makes no sense unless it is in confrontation and conflict with systemic power;
however, this is not the approach of most development work in the oPt, which tends to ignore the
broader question of power completely. Usually, development projects follow a model that
attempts to coexist with the structural determinants of Israeli colonialism. In the worst examples,
these development models actually attempt to incorporate Israeli colonialism into the very
practice of development itself. As Mohan and Stokke observe, many development practices in the
Global South share this approach, based upon what they call “a harmony model of power” in
which “power resides with individual members of a community and can increase with the
successful pursuit of individual and collective goals. This implies that the empowerment of the
powerless could be achieved within the existing social order without any significant negative
effects upon the power of the powerful.”21 As a result, development practice tends to “aim at
improving those at the margins within the existing systems without really questioning the unequal
power dynamics that create inequality in the first place.”22
The remainder of this paper concerns selected features of Israeli settler colonialism and its impact
on development processes. Before moving to this discussion, however, it is necessary to first articulate
the concept of power. Drawing upon the vast development literature that addresses the concept, this
article outlines and utilizes three basic, interconnected meanings of power.23 The first is the standard
understanding of power as “the ability to dominate.”24 In this sense, power contains a sense of
compulsion, forcing people to act in a particular fashion. This might result from military
superiority, control of economic resources and borders, or restrictions on movement of goods and
people.
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A secondmeaning conceives of power in an indirect sense. People may act in particular ways not
because of a physical threat or compulsion but because they believe that it is in their best interest
to do so or because they fail to see any effective alternatives. In this sense, their lack of “ability to
see and conceive alternatives”25 is a form of psychological domination. People follow a direction
because they mistakenly think that no other possibilities exist.26 As discussed below, this
conception of power is closely linked to interpretations of the past and forms of historical
narrative and national identity.
In a closely related sense, the third meaning of power conveys the feelings “of self-worth and self-
esteem that people hold in themselves.”27 These feelings may occur at the individual level and across
different social groups. Like the first two types of power, here too there is a psychological dimension:
without feelings of self-worth and self-esteem—and this, it is important to emphasize, does not refer
solely to an individual sense but very much a collective spirit—it becomes difficult to believe in,
conceive of, and struggle for different alternatives. Among the distinguishing effects of colonial
domination, as Frantz Fanon noted decades ago, is its ability to produce a “people in whose soul
an inferiority complex has been created.”28
Palestinians contend with Israeli power in all three forms in their attempts to understand and
counteract the effects of Israeli colonialism in the oPt. The remainder of this paper discusses how
these forms of power operate—and are hidden—within the dominant approach to development.
Fragmentation and Dehistoricization
For over six decades, Israeli settler colonialism has divided and fractured the Palestinian people.
The different waves of twentieth century colonization in Palestine have deliberately aimed to splinter
Palestinians into a patchwork of fragmented, dispersed territories that evolve as distinct social
formations.29 The various categories used to describe the Palestinian people speak to that
proposition: Palestinian refugees; Palestinians who remained on their land in 1948 and later
became Israeli citizens (the Palestinian citizens of Israel or PCI); the fragmentation of the West
Bank into isolated cantons; the separation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and now the apparent
division of East Jerusalem from the West Bank. Palestinians living in these geographical zones
constitute the Palestinian nation, but Zionist colonization since before 1948 has been steadily
eroding this unity. The ways in which Israeli power operates in the oPt is one element of the
broader Zionist project, and thus a theorization and understanding of the logic of fragmentation
must be viewed as essential to mapping the nature of colonial strategy in the oPt. Similarly, the
logic of fragmentation must also inform our conception and implementation of development in
the oPt. Fragmentation is not solely a spatial process; it also occurs through temporal disruption.
In other words, Israeli power relies not only on the geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian
nation but on assaulting its very history, dehistoricizing the Palestinian experience and reducing it
to a recent narrative that accepts the results of fragmentation as de facto and permanent.30
Temporal disruption makes it possible to speak of Gazans, for example, with no reference to how
this category itself was constructed through the forcible fragmentation of the Palestinian people as
a whole, first in 1948 and then through the separation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Because
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these categories are accepted as givens and become the legitimate (and sole) focus of development
intervention, they continue to reproduce. In this light, an uncritical and dehistoricized
developmental strategy lends materiality to Israeli power and sustains fragmentation.
This process of fragmentation—both its spatial and temporal aspects—relies on the first form of
power as forceful compulsion described above. Israel bars Palestinian refugees from returning to
their land, separates the West Bank and Gaza Strip from one another, places restrictions on the
movement of PCI into the oPt, and completely controls movement in the West Bank itself.31 But
fragmentation is also reflected in the sense of “power to see and conceive options for change.”32
The development discourse has fully internalized the fragmentation of the Palestinian people.
With few notable exceptions, NGOs in the oPt operate as though the Palestinian population
consists entirely of those people living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (and, increasingly, in only
one of these areas). It is rare to find developmental work that openly confronts and rejects this
process of fragmentation, conceiving of the Palestinian people in their unity across the various
constructed borders. This is particularly pertinent in the case of projects that link with the PCI,
whose Palestinian-Arab identity the Israeli state has long sought to reframe as an ethnic minority.
For many Palestinians, this process of fragmentation generates a narrowing of political vision
and imagination, a manifestation of the second and third forms of power discussed above.
Fragmentation weakens collective identity as the social horizon contracts to the confined borders
of those cantons in which people happen to live. Ramallah is a striking example of this: as the
headquarters of PA ministries, international donors, and local NGOs, it has taken on a life of its
own. Circumscribed within these borders, people find it difficult to conceive of alternative paths
of action. This narrowing vision becomes normalized, sustaining the operational practice of NGOs
and other development agencies while further reinforcing social disunity and torpor vis-à-vis a
collective political project.
Absenting Power, Incorporating the Occupation
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the process of fragmentation has unfolded thanks to Israel’s
strategy of achieving control over the Palestinian population without the attendant costs of a
direct military presence in Palestinian towns and villages.33 This is not new, for the 1967 Allon
Plan explicitly called for this method of domination in the West Bank. It is striking how various
maps discussing final status issues today reflect the projected borders of the Allon Plan.34
Through the 1990s, this system of control developed into a complex bureaucratic structure of
permits, checkpoints, and zoning laws to control the movement of people and goods between the
patchwork of territories in the West Bank (with Gaza constituting its own self-contained
fragment). The system of military orders that has governed Palestinian life since 1967 continues to
exist. Moreover, Israel controls electricity, water, cellular communications, and even the Internet;
this infrastructure may be marketed by Palestinian companies, but in the final analysis it is
ultimately supplied and controlled by Israel.35 These are all illustrations of the first form of
power—the ability to compel Palestinians to act in particular ways. Despite the apparent veneer of
Palestinian autonomy, the Oslo process did not lead to a lessening of Israeli power but rather to a
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change in its form. In the post-Oslo years, Israel has sharpened and rearticulated its control; as a
consequence, Palestinian development is today subject to Israeli power more than at any point in
history.
One of the most important forms of this control is the economic system that has developed
under colonization. The Palestinian economy is fundamentally structured by its dependency on
Israel. Through the 1970s and 1980s, this dependency grew as a result of military orders that
prevented Palestinian industrial and agricultural development and yoked the pool of cheap
Palestinian labor to the Israeli economy.36 Today, the system controls essential goods entering the
oPt, multiplying the profits of Israel’s largest companies in myriad ways. First, with the oPt a key
market for Israeli goods and Palestinian consumption largely funded through external capital
flows, much of the foreign aid essentially flows to Israeli firms.37 Second, the prevalent forms of
development across the West Bank today—such as new buildings, cafés, housing complexes,
malls, and industrial zones—primarily benefit Israeli business and only a meager portion of
Palestinian society, a point that will be discussed further below. Additional aspects of this
economic control include the absence of a Palestinian currency, which leaves the monetary system
in the oPt beholden to Israel’s central bank and results in severe inflation that, again, benefits
Israeli companies but drains wealth from the Palestinian population.38
Any analysis of development in the oPt must incorporate such structural considerations. To
speak of development, in particular economic policy-making, without starting from the fact that
the Palestinian economy operates essentially as a dependent adjunct to Israel, is to conceal the
exploitative relationship at the core of Israel’s occupation. Disregard for such considerations runs
almost unquestioned in all the major multilateral agency reports on Palestinian economic
development. The World Bank, for example, devotes thousands of pages of analysis to outlining
the necessary steps for Palestinian state-building. It does so by positing policy choices by the PA
and Israel as complementary rather than viewing settler colonialism as a form of power that
structures all aspects of Palestinian life. While multilateral agencies encourage Israel to tinker with
aspects of its policy so as to enable effective PA operations, Israel is conceptualized as playing a
potentially positive role in Palestinian development. A 2010 World Bank report states, for example:
The twin pillars of sustainable growth and robust institutions for the future Palestinian
state must be a joint undertaking of the PA, GoI [Government of Israel], as well as the inter-
national community. As this report has laid out, all three have played their role in the recent
growth that has taken place in WB&G [West Bank and Gaza]: the GoI by easing movement
and access restrictions, and the donors by funding the PA’s spending. All three actors contin-
ue to have important roles to play for this recent growth to transform into sustainable growth,
and for the sustainable growth to support further progress for robust institution-building. For
the GoI, further actions to improve the conditions on the ground and allow a real take-off in
private sector development are necessary. For the PA, a continuation on the path of improv-
ing the business environment is key, as are the measures it is taking to strengthen its fiscal
position and thereby bolster its institutions. And for the donor community, continued gener-
osity is of the essence to consolidate the substantial gains made by the PA and allow it to
reduce its reliance on external support without compromising basic service delivery to the
Palestinian population.39
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This World Bank statement demonstrates how the development discourse in the oPt effaces
Israeli power. From the bank’s perspective, the joint efforts of the Israeli government, PA, and the
international community can solve the problem of economic development. All three parties must
contribute to this process: Israel, by easing movement and access restrictions, the PA, by building
the right institutional framework, and donors, by funding the overall process.40 These three
activities aim primarily at growing the Palestinian private sector, purportedly leading to a
sustainable economic future for the Palestinian population in these areas, an agenda rooted in the
World Bank’s dominant neoliberal outlook. Within this perspective, there are no structural
relations of exploitation and domination between Israel and the Palestinian population in the oPt.
In a similar fashion, the term international community also empties the global economy of its
sharply hierarchical power relations, presenting it as a neutral, homogenous, and disinterested
body concerned simply with the welfare of the Palestinian people.
Ignoring these relations of power means that Israeli colonialism becomes part of the process of
Palestinian development itself. When the World Bank, for example, asks the PA “to work
alongside Israeli Customs [at the Allenby Bridge] and practice actual customs border procedures
and gain needed experience,”41 it reframes Israel’s control over borders as a technical skill rather
than an integral feature of how the occupation actually works. Perhaps the starkest illustration of
this discursive shift is the World Bank’s funding of Israeli checkpoints inside the separation
wall, which normalizes the architecture of Israeli settler colonialism in the name of speeding
up trade.42
Arguments justifying this approach as a way to work with the status quo in order to improve the
day-to-day conditions of Palestinians on the ground only serve to reinforce and strengthen that same
Israeli power that has now been woven into the process of development. Depicting Israel as a neutral
partner or merely another stakeholder makes it more difficult to confront Israeli settler colonialism
in any meaningful fashion because the structures of the occupation become increasingly entangled
with Palestinian development itself. This may certainly entail a change in the form of Israel’s
control—a shift from direct military presence toward a greater reliance on bureaucratic-juridical-
economic frameworks of control—but it does not fundamentally alter the relationship that exists
between Israel and Palestinian society in the oPt.
Neoliberalism and the Neutrality of Markets
The conception of development described above reflects, and has been reinforced by, the
neoliberal economic program embraced by the PA. Neoliberalism is a set of policies that first rose
to prominence in the 1980s and now dominates official development thinking at the global level.43
Its overall approach is to ascribe the problems of development in the Global South to the
supposed weakness of the private sector and the rent-seeking of state officials. As a result,
neoliberalism internalizes the causes of underdevelopment within individual societies in the South
and posits a non-exploitative world market in which flows of capital and goods between countries
are mutually beneficial (succinctly expressed, for example, in the economic doctrine of
comparative advantage).44 According to the neoliberal worldview, the solution to the South’s
development problems is to open markets to the outside world, lift restrictions on investment in
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key sectors of the economy, liberalize ownership laws, end subsidies to the poor for food and other
necessities, deregulate labor markets, and increase market competition.45 By allowing unfettered
markets to operate freely, this view argues, the private sector will be the key engine of growth and
this harnessing of entrepreneurial initiative will lead to the creation of jobs and prosperity.
The economic framework adopted by the PA has fully embraced this logic as evidenced in its
2007 Palestinian Reform and Development Program (PRDP), and in subsequent national
development strategies, whose goal is to create a “diversified and thriving free market economy
led by a pioneering private sector that is in harmony with the Arab world, [and] is open to
regional and global markets.”46 In order to achieve this goal, the PA has pursued a program of
fiscal austerity, a development strategy based on tax-free industrial zones and conspicuous
private-sector projects, and closer security cooperation with Israel. As these policies have been
critiqued elsewhere,47 the pertinent issue here is the manner in which the PA’s broader economic
strategy posits the neutrality of international financial institutions (IFIs) and, most importantly, of
markets themselves.
In the former case, IFIs present themselves as neutral, technocratic experts on economic issues,
which aim simply to provide sound advice on matters of economic policy and institutional
governance.48 In practice, however, key institutions such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have been promoting neoliberalism at a global level—enforcing this
approach through debt and structural adjustment programs. In the case of Palestine, the power of
the IFIs is evinced in the fact that donor funding to the PA runs through a trust fund
headquartered in Washington and managed by the World Bank,49 with the disbursement of funds
contingent on the PRDP’s progress. Today, that conditionality has extended to all international
lending to the PA. In this manner, IFIs directly shape Palestinian economic development and
understanding Palestinian development processes in the oPt thus requires a full interrogation of
the power relations inherent to institutions such as the World Bank as well as the content of the
neoliberal agenda itself.50 On the question of trade, the World Bank writes,
As a small open economy, the future Palestinian state will depend upon increasing trade. . . .
Increasing trade and integration into the international markets will provide consumers access to
a wider range of products at lower prices, while producers will benefit from higher prices found
on the world market. . . . In addition, becoming competitive on the export market will force
Palestinian producers to improve their productivity, thereby increasing employment, raising wag-
es, and lowering poverty . . . [trade in intermediate inputs] provides an important opportunity for
a future Palestinian state, located as it is close to both the highly developed Israeli and European
economies.51
This perspective is remarkable for its presumption that the unhindered operation of the
market will produce the best possible outcome (increasing employment, higher wages,
lowered poverty, and so forth).52 It exemplifies the “harmony model of power” wherein all
participants, regardless of wealth or position within the structure of occupation, benefit
from the increasing spread of market relations.53 Power is disappeared, and so too is the
acknowledgment that those who wield it have the ability to shape outcomes that serve their
own interests.
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Indeed, the much more likely outcome of the World Bank scenario—precisely because of
Palestinian proximity to “the highly developed Israeli and European economies”— is the
development of a low-wage, highly exploited workforce as a prerequisite for “becoming
competitive on the export market” and “improv[ing] productivity.”54 Impoverishment of the
majority alongside the enrichment of a tiny layer of Palestinian society that acts as the
interlocutor with Israeli and foreign capital, is the end point that will, as Raja Khalidi and
Sobhi Samour put it, “perpetuate Palestinian dependence on Israel and allow personal
prosperity for some but communal impoverishment for all.”55
The key point here is that market neutrality benefits those who wield power—which, in the case
of Palestine, inevitably means Israeli companies and a narrow layer of the Palestinian elite—and
worsens the living standards of the vast majority. Recent poverty statistics point to growing
inequality within Palestinian society and confirm this prognosis.56 It is necessary, therefore, to
look beyond simple aggregate measures of development—such as gross domestic product
growth—and instead probe questions of inequality and the distribution of wealth in order to
determine who are truly the winners and losers of development processes.
One final aspect of neoliberalism is important to highlight: the massive expansion of financial
markets in recent decades. According to the Palestinian Monetary Authority, the amount of
money disbursed in loans to individuals residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip more than
doubled from $1 billion in 2010 to $2.2 billion by end-2015.57 Much of this credit is used toward
residential real estate, automobile purchases, and consumer loans. In these three sectors alone,
loan amounts extended to individuals grew by a remarkable 160 percent between 2011 and 2015
(reaching $869.4 million).58 These figures stand in sharp contrast to the widespread deterioration
in living standards in the oPt: in 2014, unemployment stood at 26.9 percent of the workforce (in a
context where labor force participation is only 45.8 percent), and more than one quarter of the
population was living under the poverty line.59 Given such figures, the expansion of financial
markets is a good indication of the extent to which apparent development across the West Bank
has been debt-fueled: the Ramallah urban landscape has transformed strikingly over the past few
years, with a proliferation of billboards promoting banks and credit as for the purchase of large-
ticket items such as houses, cars, and other consumer goods.
The growth of finance is an integral feature of neoliberalism—described in the nomenclature of
IFIs as “financial deepening”—and it plays a significant role in the articulation of power in the oPt.60
As numerous scholars have noted, the spread of individual and household debt has a profound
impact on social behavior and the patterns of everyday life within contemporary capitalism.61
Individuals increasingly depend upon financial markets to meet their daily needs while the
management of various forms of personal risk—such as insurance, medical needs, social security,
and pensions—becomes subject to mediation by financial institutions.62 This fits neatly with the
decline in provision of social services under neoliberalism. All of these aspects of financialization
are closely connected to the second and third forms of power noted earlier: a difficulty in
conceiving alternative options and an erosion of the self-confidence that people hold in
themselves. Indeed, some authors have pointed to how financial markets may corrode forms of
collective struggle and social solidarity, as individuals become primarily concerned with
conditions of stability and their perceived ability to meet future financial payments.63
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Such an argument is not meant to convey pessimism about the possibility for collective struggle.
Rather, it is a call to register the ways in which the neoliberalization (and financialization) of
the economy can generate a tendency for people to seek individual solutions to what are
fundamentally social problems. At the same time, the effects of neoliberalism also point to new
terrains of struggle. Immanent to finance-led neoliberalism is a dire imbalance in the patterns and
forms of accumulation between different sectors of the population and geographic areas; thus,
neoliberalism also produces sharper class contradictions within Palestinian society. Acknowledging
such contradictions is necessary to a proper assessment of the possibilities for development and the
capacity for injecting a dynamic of struggle into the process.
From this perspective, development in the oPt is always interlaced with forms of power that
structure the capacity of Palestinians to resist, which on a psychological level affect how people
behave and think about themselves and their relationship to society. As a result, it is incumbent
upon us to interrogate how power operates, how it reproduces itself, and what can be done to
challenge it. The insistence on the neutrality of development and the belief that it is not there are
both a manifestation of the existence of such power. To treat development simply as a
technocratic and apolitical process is to reinforce and support the dominant forms of power.
Thus, it is urgent to expose and reveal power—to think more intentionally about how power
relations are intrinsic to all development practice within the oPt.
How can development be conceived not as a question of growth, governance, or participation but
rather as a form of resistance and struggle? First, if the essence of Israeli settler colonialism is the
ongoing attempt to fragment and dehistoricize the Palestinian people, then reframing
development requires asserting the unity of the people as a whole and building connections across
borders, whether physical and mental, constructed by colonization. In other words, it is necessary
to reject any narrowing of the Palestinian question to simply the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Israeli colonization affects all segments of Palestinian society, including those individuals who may
now hold Israeli citizenship, Palestinian refugees, as well as the Diaspora. Narrowing the
parameters to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or to the post-Oslo period, internalizes and
consolidates the results of Israeli settler colonialism. How many development initiatives, for
example, look at strengthening connections between PCIs and those living in the West Bank or in
the Diaspora? Of course, there are practical problems involved, because legal and administrative
measures actualize fragmentation, but the point is that the power of colonialism operates through
this process of fragmentation.
Second, resistance to power necessitates a rejection of efforts to enforce its legitimacy.
Development as struggle means adopting a framework that refuses to normalize colonial power,
as exemplified by the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which rejects any joint
activities with Israeli state institutions or projects that normalize colonial power and present the
situation of Palestinians as simply a conflict between two parties. The success of the BDS
movement can be traced to its ability to highlight and expose the reality of power and its refusal
to legitimize and normalize it. To say “no” can be a tremendously powerful act. This notion of
antinormalization is not a recent invention or foreign import but has a played a prominent role in
the history of the Palestinian struggle for decades.
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Finally, the neoliberal development strategy has generated increasingly sharp inequalities
within Palestinian society itself. Neoliberalism atomizes and fragments Palestinian society,
making collective struggle more difficult in an environment of individualized consumption. A
society that prioritizes such a development trajectory weakens its resilience and capacities. For
this reason, the internal struggle against neoliberalism is inextricably connected to the broader
struggle against Israeli power. Practically, this implies an emphasis on defending and
extending social rights and rejecting the myth of market neutrality. Sociologist Jamil Hilal
stresses that “empowering of Palestinians in the WBGS [West Bank and Gaza Strip] to
organize themselves to defy and challenge the colonizing apartheid state, requires being
guided by the principles of equality and social justice in fashioning their society, and not
leaving it to the whims of the colonial power, the donors, or the market.” He goes on to
suggest possible campaigns, such as “legislation to establish a decent minimum wage, to
provide formal protection to the unemployed, and to re-activate the social insurance law to be
implemented in accordance to resources available with special attention to those with special
needs. A strategy of widening the free provision of health care and education to cover all
citizens would be an empowering strategy. Such a strategy should be based on an appreciation
of women’s role in the provision of care and right to participate in the paid labor force.”64
Importantly, such principles are equally valid in the rest of the Arab world. The economic
policies implemented by the PA today are not unique; they have been the standard fare of
governments across the Middle East for at least two decades. Indeed, the uprisings that erupted
across the region in 2011 were, in essence, a reflection of the effects of neoliberal transformations
driven by autocratic rulers such as Hosni Mubarak and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali with the strong
support of the World Bank and other IFIs.65 Thus, any struggle against the economic policies of
the PA aligns with similar movements across the broader region. The more such links are
strengthened by building cross-border solidarity among grassroots workers, students, and farmer
organizations, the more effective the resistance against the neoliberal development models can
become. When empowerment incorporates a full understanding of Israeli power it acquires real
meaning as development functions to struggle against and resist fragmentation, the legitimacy of
or normalization with the Israeli state, and neoliberalism. As the history of the Palestinian people
demonstrates, it is only mass, collective struggle that can confront Israeli power in all its
manifestations and offer a glimpse of real human development.
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